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Death is a requirement for a life. If birth is the beginning of life, death is end of life. We 
may exist before we die and we make exist after we die. Or, we may only exist between birth and 
death. Either way, birth and death are demarcations of our known existence. Ideally, we live a full 
life of experiences, pleasures, and happiness for the longest possible time without suffering. 
Hedonism attempts to measure this with a simple measurement: did X life have more pleasure 
than pain? If this is the simple hedonic definition of the good, what happens if the time factor of 
life changes? In theory, a longer life means greater pleasure can be attained. Conversely, it also 
means a greater amount of pain is equally possible. If a life is made of a beginning and end point, 
what happens to the quality of life if only one those time factors shifts? This is the final puzzle Fred 
Feldman analyzes in Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death. 
Late Birth vs. Early Death 
 If hedonism truly is as simple a proposition as the [good life = pleasure > pain], adding two 
time points changes the quality of life. For the purpose of this essay, death is labeled as T2 and 
birth is labeled as T1. The simplest time-factored pleasure is T2 being greater than T1 by the 
greatest factor possible. Our new hedonic equation is this: quality of life = [(T2 – T1) * (pleasure – 
pain)]. Feldman asks if T1 or T2 changes, which T has a greater impact on the quality of life. 
Feldman describes the human tendency to “feel that early death is a greater misfortune for the 
prematurely deceased than is ‘late birth’ for the late born, even though each may deprive us of as 
much happiness as the other” (Feldman 221). Suppose that a person name Claudette was born in 
1950 (T1) and dies in 2000 (T2). This early death may be considered a misfortune. Now, if we 
modify this and T2 becomes 2035, Claudette’s quality life would increase as she now dies happily 
at the age of 85. But what if Claudette’s timeline moves in a different direction and T1 changes to 
1915 and T2 remains 2000. Assuming that Claudette has the same amount of pleasure and pain, 
Feldman’s logic says that 85 years of life should hold the same quality regardless of the value of T1. 
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Yet, it seems uncomfortable to say that her late birth is an equal misfortune as her premature 
death. 
In the possible world Feldman constructs for Claudette, any fluctuation in pleasure or pain 
is ignored in favor of total lifespan as the general measure of quality of life. Feldman addresses this 
saying “the results are that the deprivation of 35 happy years of life is a bad thing, whether these 
years would have occurred before the date at which Claudette was in fact born, or after the date on 
which she in fact died” (223). Feldman suggests that we address our “apparently irrational 
emotional asymmetry” by trying to “start viewing late birth as a bad thing” and proposes that 
“Claudette’s late birth was just as bad for as was her early death” (223). The asymmetry lies in the 
human assumption that early death is a tragedy while no one aments a late birth. 
Is emotional asymmetry irrational? 
 By insinuating that humans are irrational when it comes to which end is fixed—Feldman 
suggests that the perfectly rational human believes a late birth that removed 35 years from 
Claudette’s life is perfectly equal to an early death that removed 35 years of death. Either way, 
Claudette lived for 50 years. If that is the case, an earlier birth or later death that resulted in an 85-
year lifespan for Claudette is the best of all possible worlds. 
 Feldman seems fixed on the idea that this “irrational emotional asymmetry” on preferring 
the late birth to the early death is  
explained by the fact that we tend to think that the past is fixed, whereas the future is still 
open. Thus, we may feel that there’s no point in lamenting the fact that Claudette missed 
the Early Pleasure [of late birth]. On the other hand, we may feel that there was a ‘real 
chance’ that she might have enjoyed the Late Pleasure [of early death]. Her loss of that 
seems a greater misfortune (224). 
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By employing this line of reasoning, Feldman appears to be caught in the basic assumption that a 
longer lifespan is always superior to a shorter lifespan. 
Feldman himself seems to note this when he says living from 1950 to 2000 may be 
preferable to living to from 1915 to 2000 because of the greater suffering in the world from 1915 to 
1950. If Claudette has “has just fifty years to live, she’s better off living them in the second half of 
the twentieth century, rather than thirty-five years earlier” (222). Is it truly better to live from 1950 
to 2000 (W1) than it is to live from 1915 to 2000 (W2)? The years 1915 to 1950 were marked with 
two world wars, the Great Depression, lacked penicillin and other medical advances, diseases such 
as whooping cough and measles were common—considering these factors it appears that the 
likelihood of pain is significantly greater than the possible pain if Claudette lived only between 
1950 and 2000. Therefore, “it follows that early death is worse for Claudette then late birth. Her 
late birth deprived her of very little value; her early death would deprive her of a lot” (222). W1 
can be presented in the quality of life equation as [(2000 {T2}– 1950 {T1}) * (100 {pleasure} - 85 
{pain})]—this equates to a quality of life index of 750. Compare this with the increased lifespan and 
pain in W2: [(2000 {T2] – 1915 {T1}) * (100 {pleasure} – 95 {pain})]—a quality of life index of 425. 
Feldman uncovers an asymmetry here: if Claudette were to die later, we assume that her birthdate 
is fixed and that she lives longer. If we change her birthdate, we assume her lifespan is fixed and 
adjust the deathdate to accommodate the earlier birthdate. 
 It appears that Feldman’s conception of hedonism falls shorts. In the possible world he 
proposes for Claudette, pleasure is attained and pain is experienced over a lifespan of 85 years, 
and the pleasure and pain factors remain constant regardless of a late birth or an early death that 
decrease the lifespan by 35 years, then perhaps there is a perfect symmetry between late birth and 
early death. However, Feldman is assuming that pain and pleasure will be constants despite his 
own example of the additional pain of being born into the world of 1915-1950. 
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Conclusion 
We have no control over our birth—we come into the world whenever we come into this 
world. No human being suffers from being born too late. One may wish they were born early 
enough so they could be there when we first walked on the moon. One may lament that they 
weren’t there to see John F. Kennedy be sworn into office. One may wish they born in time to 
participate in the fall of Berlin wall. Yet, genuine pain never occurred because someone was not 
there to experience those historical events. After all, we have no control over our birth—we are at 
the whims and winds of the universe when it comes to our existence. Therefore, late birth is no 
tragedy. 
The difference between late birth and early death is that we consciously experience death—
we know death is coming from the moment we are born. Throughout our lives, we have some 
measure of influence in the pleasure and pain that we experience. In that sense, perhaps hedonism 
is true. But, “once they are past, we become indifferent toward our pleasures and pains; while they 
are still in the future, we care deeply about them. If hedonism is true, this sort of asymmetry is 
wholly irrational” (224). Perhaps this is why Stoicism came after hedonism—we have some measure 
of control, even if for a moment, in how long we live and how we die. We are indifferent to our 
birth since we have no control over how we came to be but we very much have a stake in our 
death. We have the ability to make choices and even Feldman is forced to admit that our 
preference for the future “might be a deep-seated feature of human psychology” (224). 
The human preference for the future is based in the idea that life is always improving at a 
macro-level. New knowledge is being learned, new things are developing, humans are developing 
as a species, we are always improving in some capacity even it is difficult to measure on a day-to-
day basis. Philosophy itself is in constant development—we always look to the past, mindful of great 
minds but we are always in pursuit of the future. 
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